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 2 
This chapter identifies decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and 
selected lower federal and state courts in the past year that interpret 
and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and could have an 
impact on securities arbitration practice.
1
 
 
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
 
Since the publication of last summer’s PLI Arbitration 
Law Update 2013, the Supreme Court decided three new 
arbitration cases.
2
   
 
A. “Effective Vindication” Doctrine: American  
  Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
 
In June 2013, the Supreme Court decided American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
3
  In that case, the Court 
reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
4
 and enforced a pre-
dispute arbitration clause containing a class action waiver in 
American Express merchants’ credit card processing agreements.  
The Court rejected a claim – endorsed three separate times by the 
Court of Appeals
5
 – that the class action waiver was unenforceable 
                                                 
1
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2013). Because securities arbitration necessarily 
“involves commerce” (FAA § 2), courts apply the FAA to issues arising 
out of securities arbitrations. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
537 U.S. 79 (2002).   
2
 Two of these cases were decided before the August 2013 PLI program, 
but after the publication of the 2013 Update, so we summarize them here. 
3
 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
4
 In re Am. Exp. Merch. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Amex III”), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
5
 See Id.; In re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“Amex I”); In re Am. Exp. Merch. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011); 
(“Amex II”).  The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Intern. Corp, 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (holding that arbitrators cannot apply 
their own policy views when construing an arbitration agreement that is 
 3 
because it precluded plaintiff merchants from vindicating their 
statutory rights under the federal antitrust laws.   
 
Until this decision, lower courts had interpreted the 
“vindicating statutory rights” or “effective vindication” doctrine to 
provide that a disputant could argue that an arbitration agreement 
is unenforceable because an unfair aspect of the arbitration process 
precluded that party from vindicating its federal statutory rights.
6
  
The doctrine derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement 
that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate 
its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federal] 
statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function.
7
  The Second Circuit 
concluded that the Amex plaintiffs had demonstrated through 
expert testimony that pursuing their statutory claims individually 
as opposed to through class arbitration would not be economically 
feasible, “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory 
protections of the antitrust laws.”8  
 
In the 5-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the 
Court recognized the validity of the “effective vindication” 
doctrine generally, but held that, in this case, the “fact that it is not 
                                                                                                    
silent on the allowability of class arbitration to permit it), and 
reconsidered Amex II in light of the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (enforcing 
class action waiver in consumer services arbitration agreement and 
holding that FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule, which 
“classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable”). 
6
 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 
79, 92 (2000) (recognizing in dicta that, if a party showed that pursuing 
its statutory claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, 
and thus it could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly 
refuse to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement).   
7
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637. 
8
 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217. 
 4 
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not 
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” 
Because the class action waiver in the merchants’ credit card 
services agreement with American Express did not eliminate the 
right to pursue individual claims under the antitrust laws, the 
Court deemed the waiver enforceable. Justice Scalia wrote: 
 
The “effective vindication” exception to which 
respondents allude originated as dictum in Mitsubishi 
Motors [v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985)] where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on 
“public policy” grounds, arbitration agreements that 
“operat [e] … as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to 
pursue statutory remedies” (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added).  Dismissing concerns that the arbitral forum was 
inadequate, we said that “so long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to 
serve both its remedial and deterrent function. …” 
 
As we have described, the exception finds its origin in the 
desire to prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right to 
pursue statutory remedies,” Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 
637, n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3346 (emphasis added). That would 
certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement 
forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. 
And it would perhaps cover filing and 
administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high 
as to make access to the forum impracticable. See Green 
Tree Financial Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90, 
121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) (“It may well be 
that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude 
a litigant … from effectively vindicating her federal 
statutory rights”). “But the fact that it is not worth the 
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not 
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that 
remedy.”9 
                                                 
9
 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
 5 
 
Of course, in our view, the right to pursue a remedy is 
meaningless and hollow if, as a practical matter, it is not 
financially possible to pursue.  Together with the Court’s 2011 
decision in AT&T Mobility,
10
 Italian Colors effectively eliminates 
class arbitration as a procedural method of aggregating consumers’ 
low value claims that are subject to an otherwise enforceable 
arbitration agreement.   
 
Since FINRA does not permit class arbitration in its 
forum, and it bars class action waivers in customer agreements,
11
 
this decision has a more limited impact on customer claims in 
FINRA arbitration.  Italian Colors appears to be applicable, 
however, to FINRA intra-industry and employment arbitration.
12
 
 
B. Silent Arbitration Agreements and Class  
  Arbitration: Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter 
 
In recent years, Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence has, in 
effect, restricted the use of class arbitration as inconsistent with the 
FAA.  For example, in Stolt-Nielson v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,13 
the Court ruled that, when an arbitration clause is silent on whether 
the parties agreed to class arbitration, the arbitration panel cannot 
apply its own views of policy and infer that a mere agreement to 
                                                 
10
 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  For a detailed discussion of the case, see Jill I. 
Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
2011, at 205 (Practising Law Institute 2011). 
11
 See Part II.A, infra. 
12
 See, e.g., Hendricks v. UBS Financial Servs., Inc., 546 F. App’x 514 
(5
th
 Cir. 2013) (compelling FINRA arbitration of employees’ class claims 
against employer despite class action waiver and forum prohibition on 
class arbitration and leaving it to arbitration panel to reconcile).  Cf. 
Alokazai v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., __ F. App’x __, 2014 WL 487075 
(9
th
 Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) (denying motion to compel FINRA arbitration of 
employees’ class claims despite arbitration clause because no class action 
waiver). 
13
 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
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arbitrate evidences the parties’ intent to consent to class 
arbitration.
14
  The Court, however, did not decide “what 
contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed to 
authorize class-action arbitration.”15  Some commentators 
speculated that the Court would reject any attempt by an arbitrator 
to interpret an arbitration agreement silent on the availability of 
class arbitration to allow for the process.
16
 
 
Surprisingly, in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
17
 a 
unanimous June 2013 opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the 
Court held that when parties agree that an arbitrator should 
determine what their contract means, a court cannot overturn the 
arbitrator’s ultimate interpretation of a contract unless the 
arbitrator exceeded his or her power in violation of § 10(a)(4) of 
the FAA.
18
  
 
In Oxford Health Plans, Sutter, a pediatrician, and Oxford 
Health Plans, a health insurance company, entered into a contract 
that stated “[n]o civil action concerning any dispute arising under 
this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such 
disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New 
Jersey, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association with one arbitrator.”19 When Sutter sued on behalf of 
himself and others in state court, the court granted Oxford’s 
motion to compel arbitration based on their contract.
20
 Both parties 
agreed that an arbitrator should determine whether the contract 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 672 (holding that an arbitrator ‘exceeded [his] powers’ under 
FAA §10(a)(4) when he imposed his own public policy views rather than 
interpreted and enforced a contract that was silent on class arbitration).  
15
 Id. at 687 n.10. 
16
 See, e.g., Kristen Blankley, “Blankley on the Newest Class Arbitration 
Case to Reach the Supreme Court,” ADR Prof Blog, available at 
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=4165 (Dec. 8, 2012). 
17
 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013). 
18
 Id. at  2071.  
19
 Id. at  2067.  
20
 Id.  
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between the parties allowed for class action arbitration.
21
  
However, when the arbitrator decided against Oxford and found 
that the contract authorized class action arbitrations because class 
actions are a form of civil actions, Oxford sought to vacate the 
arbitrator’s decision on the basis that the arbitrator violated § 
10(a)(4) by exceeding his power.
22
 The District Court denied its 
motion and the Third Circuit affirmed.  
 
In affirming the Third Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that, since the parties agreed to let the arbitrator interpret the 
contract, as long as the arbitrator construed the document, his 
interpretation must stand, even if he made a grave error in the 
ultimate interpretation.
23
 Unlike the arbitration panel in Stolt-
Nielson, the arbitrator in Oxford did not impose his own views of 
policy when interpreting the arbitration contract.  Thus, the Court 
still permits class arbitration when arbitrators interpret the 
arbitration agreement as manifesting the parties’ intent to allow for 
it. 
 
Since FINRA does not permit class arbitration in its 
forum, if the parties incorporate FINRA rules by reference in their 
arbitration agreement, then presumably a court or arbitrator would 
construe that arbitration agreement to exclude the possibility of 
class arbitration.
24
 
 
C. Arbitration Treaties as Arbitration   
  Agreements: BG Group v. Repub. of Argentina 
 
In March 2014, in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice 
Breyer, the Supreme Court held, in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of 
                                                 
21
 Id.  
22
 Id.  
23
 Id. at 2070.  
24
 See note 12, supra. 
 8 
Argentina,
25
 that arbitrators, not judges, should interpret and apply 
a local litigation requirement of an international treaty provision, 
and, on motions to affirm or vacate arbitral awards, courts must 
give appropriate deference to the arbitrators’ decisions.26  
 
In the early 1990s, BG Group, a British firm, had an 
investment interest in an Argentine entity called MetroGAS, a 
privatized natural gas utility.
27
 When Argentina faced economic 
problems in the early 2000s, it enacted new laws that called for 
calculating gas tariffs in pesos instead of dollars.
28
 This change in 
the basis for calculating gas tariffs led to BG Group’s profits 
quickly turning into losses.
29
 BG Group claimed Argentina had 
violated the investment treaty between the two countries and 
sought arbitration according to Article 8 of the treaty which 
allowed for “the parties to agree to proceed directly to 
arbitration.”30 
 
However, Article 8(2)(a) of the treaty also contained a 
local litigation requirement that either party must first submit a 
dispute to a competent tribunal, and, if after 18 months that 
tribunal fails to reach a final decision, then the parties may take the 
dispute to arbitration.
31
 Although Argentina argued that the 
arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to decide the dispute because 
of Article 8(2)(a), the panel determined that it did have 
jurisdiction, and that compliance with Article 8(2)(a) was excused 
because of a series of Argentinian laws that would block any 
                                                 
25
 134 S.Ct 1198 (2014).  
26
 Id. at 1207-08, 1212. 
27
 Id. at 1204.  
28
 Id.  
29
 Id.  
30
 Id. at 1203.  
31
 Id.   
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lawsuit by BG Group.
32
  The arbitration panel awarded BG Group 
$185 million in damages.
33
  
 
The District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed 
the award,
34
 but the D.C. Circuit reversed.  After reviewing the 
award de novo, the Court of Appeals found that Article 8(2)(a) 
stripped the arbitration panel of its jurisdiction to hear the dispute 
since the parties had not first brought the dispute to a competent 
tribunal.
35
  
 
BG Group appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court 
analyzed the treaty as if it were an ordinary contract between 
private parties, and concluded that the fact that it was a treaty made 
no difference to the critical question of whether arbitrators or 
judges “[bear] primary responsibility for interpreting and applying 
Article 8's local court litigation provision.”36  Since courts dealing 
with ordinary contracts decide substantive issues of arbitrability 
while arbitrators decide procedural issues, and the local litigation 
requirement clause was a “purely procedural requirement,” the 
Court deferred to the arbitration panel’s determination of 
jurisdiction.
37
 Although the United States (as Amicus Curiae) 
argued that, because the Supreme Court was dealing with a treaty 
and not an ordinary contract, it should not apply the “ordinary 
interpretive framework,” the Court found no express language in 
the treaty to set aside this framework.
38
  
 
                                                 
32
 Id. at 1205.  
33
 Id.  
34
 Repub. of Argentine v. BG Group, 715 F.Supp.2d 108 (D.D.C. 2010), 
rev’d, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014).   
35
 Repub. of Argentine v. BG Group, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
rev’d, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014).  
36
 BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198, 1206 
(2014).   
37
 Id. at 1207-08.  
38
 Id. at 1209.  
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Under this holding, all U.S. courts that review arbitration 
treaties should interpret and apply threshold questions pertaining to 
arbitration using the framework developed for interpreting similar 
questions in ordinary contracts unless there is explicit language in 
the treaty stating otherwise.
39
   
 
II. Administrative Law Decisions 
 
A. FINRA v. Schwab Enforcement Action 
 
The 2012 and 2013 PLI Arbitration Law Updates detailed 
FINRA’s enforcement action against the broker-dealer Charles 
Schwab for inserting a class action waiver in its standard form 
customer agreement’s arbitration clause, as well as the procedural 
developments of that action through May of 2013.
40
 In the past 
year, the case concluded with its final chapter. 
 
In that enforcement action, initiated in February 2012, 
FINRA argued that Schwab’s class action waiver, which required 
customers to waive their right to bring or participate in a class or 
consolidated action, violates NASD Rule 3110(f)(4)(A) and (C), 
and its successor rules FINRA Rule 2268(d)(1) and (3) (effective 
Dec. 5, 2011).
41
  Those rules prohibit member firms from placing 
“any condition” in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that “limits 
or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization,” and 
                                                 
39
 See generally BG Group, PLC, 134 S.Ct. 1198.  This decision will 
likely have little or no impact on FINRA arbitration, because FINRA 
rules rather than a treaty are the basis for arbitration. 
40
 See Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2013, in SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION 2013, at 293-94 (Practising Law Institute 2013); Jill I. 
Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2012, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
2012, at 233-34 (Practising Law Institute 2012). 
41
 Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, Department of 
Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 
2011029760201, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/ind
ustry/p125516.pdf (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 1, 2012). 
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“limits the ability of a party to file any claim in court permitted to 
be filed in court under the rules of the forums in which a claim 
may be filed under the agreement,” respectively.  FINRA argued 
that, because Rule 12204(d) of the FINRA Code of Arbitration 
Procedure for Customer Disputes (“FINRA Customer Code”) 
addresses the manner in which customers can bring and participate 
in class actions against member firms in court, the forum rules 
clearly bar class arbitrations, and Schwab’s class action waiver 
contradicts Rule 12204.
42
  In response, Schwab argued that the 
holding of AT&T Mobility applies in the securities context, and 
displaces conflicting FINRA rules.  Schwab acknowledged that the 
mandate of the FAA may be “overridden by a ‘contrary 
congressional command,’”43 but contended there was no such 
contrary command to displace the FAA in favor of FINRA rules. 
 
In February 2013, A FINRA panel of hearing officers 
agreed with Schwab, and found that, while Schwab’s actions 
violated FINRA rules, FINRA enforcement could not enforce 
those rules against Schwab as preempted by the FAA.
44
 FINRA 
appealed that decision to the National Adjudicatory Council 
(“NAC”).45 
                                                 
42
 Id. 
43
 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (quoting 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987)).  
44
 Hearing Panel Decision, Department of Enforcement v. Charles 
Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 2011029760201, available at 
http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?DocNB=33101 
(FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2103). 
45
 Appeals from FINRA disciplinary actions are heard by the National 
Adjudicatory Council. See FINRA Code of Procedure R. 9310-13.  In an 
amicus brief jointly filed by Professors Gross and Barbara Black, they 
argued that the hearing panel’s decision was wrong, and that the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by Dodd-Frank, provides 
the “contrary congressional command” required by CompuCredit to 
displace the FAA.  That amicus brief was based largely on a law review 
article authored by Professors Black and Gross.  See Barbara Black & Jill 
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In an April 2014 ruling, FINRA's Board of Governors
46
 
reversed the aspect of the hearing panel’s decision that concluded 
that the FAA precluded enforcement of FINRA rules.
47
  Rather, the 
Board of Governors held that the Securities Exchange Act 
constituted a sufficient Congressional command to overcome the 
FAA's mandate to courts to enforce arbitration agreements as 
written.  Since the Exchange Act delegated to the SEC, which in 
turn delegated to FINRA, the authority to regulate broker-dealers' 
arbitration agreements for the protection of investors, FINRA's 
rules barring class action waivers and mandating that investors be 
able to bring class claims in court were enforceable.
48
 
 
Simultaneous with the issuance of the decision, Schwab 
entered into a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”) 
with FINRA, settling the enforcement action by consenting to a 
$500,000 penalty and agreeing not to appeal the decision 
further.
49
  Thus, the AWC ends the matter, and no court will have 
the chance to review FINRA’s ruling on the important legal issues 
arising under the FAA, at least in this case.
50
    
                                                                                                    
Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. 
COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2012). 
46
 Under FINRA Code of Procedure Rule 9349, NAC submits its 
proposed decision to the Board of Governors, which almost always 
becomes final without Board action.  The Board can, however, under rule 
9351, call a proposed decision for review and affirm, modify or reverse 
the proposed decision and/or its sanctions.  While the Board rarely 
exercises this power, it did so in the Schwab case, taking the final 
decision away from NAC. 
47
 Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Complaint No. 
2011029760201, 2014 WL 1665738 (FINRA Apr. 24, 2014).   
48
 Id. at *13-18. 
49
 FINRA, Letter of  Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, No. 
2011029760202, available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/ind
ustry/p493597.pdf (Apr. 24, 2014). 
50
 If Schwab had not agreed to the AWC, it could have appealed FINRA’s 
adverse decision to the SEC.  See Exchange Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 
 13 
 
B. NLRB’s D.R. Horton Decision 
 
In December 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
51
 rejected the National 
Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) position52 that mandatory 
arbitration provisions that waived employees’ ability to file class 
and collective actions interfered with employee rights under 
federal labor law.
53
  The court found that employees could not 
bring a class action suit against employer Horton alleging Horton 
violated federal labor laws because it concluded the arbitration 
agreement was not an unfair labor practice under the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). In particular, the court noted that 
the NLRB’s argument that Horton violated the NLRA was 
unfounded because the NLRB did not give “proper weight” to the 
FAA which made the arbitration agreement enforceable.
54
  
 
                                                                                                    
78s(d) (2006); FINRA Code of Procedure R. 9370 (A person “aggrieved” 
by a FINRA decision may then appeal to the SEC, or the SEC may 
review the matter on its own motion.).  A person aggrieved by an SEC 
final order may obtain review in the Circuit Court of Appeals in which he 
resides or has his principal place of business or to the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals. See Exchange Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 
78y.  A court of appeals decision is then subject to review by the 
Supreme Court upon certiorari or certification. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006). 
  Interestingly, if Schwab had won at the NAC or FINRA Board level, 
FINRA could not have appealed to the SEC.  FINRA, acting in its 
adjudicative capacity as a lower tribunal subject to SEC plenary review of 
its disciplinary decisions, is not an “aggrieved person.” NASD, Inc. v. 
SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
51
 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 
52
 The NLRB determined that Horton violated section 7 of the NLRA 
which allows for employees to act in concert with each other.  See D.R. 
Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).  The 
NLRB also concluded that Horton violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
which prevents employers from interfering with employees’ rights 
outlined in section 7. Id. 
53
 D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 349. 
54
 Id. at 348.  
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The Court of Appeals found no congressional command in 
the text of the NLRA sufficient to override the FAA.
55
  Likewise, 
the Fifth Circuit pointed out that numerous decisions have held 
that there is no substantive right to class or collective actions under 
the NLRA.
56
   
 
The NLRB filed a petition for rehearing (pending at the 
time of publication) asking the Fifth Circuit to reverse its holding 
that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement did not 
interfere with employees’ statutory rights.57  In the petition, the 
Board contends that the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize that a core 
right under the NLRA is for employees to be able to engage in 
class or collective actions.
58
  The NLRB’s petition contends that, 
although individual rights statutes such as the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act or Fair Labor Standards Act do not provide 
employees with a substantive right to act in concert, the NLRA is 
different because it does vest employees with this right. Therefore, 
the Board asserts that the Fifth Circuit should have relied on the 
“FAA precedent that ‘a substantive waiver of federally protected 
civil rights will not be upheld.’”59   
 
III. Federal Court Decisions  
 
The lower federal courts continue to apply the Supreme 
Court’s FAA jurisprudence when ruling on challenges to the 
                                                 
55
 The Fifth Circuit determined that the general language of the NLRA 
was insufficient to find a congressional command. Although one of the 
purposes of the NLRA was to “protect[ ] the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association ... for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection,” the 
court stated that “more explicit language has been rejected in the past.” 
Id. at 360.  
56
 Id. at 357.  
57
 D.R. Horton Inc. v. NLRB, 5th Cir., No. 12-60031, petition for 
rehearing Mar. 3, 2014 [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing].   
58
 Id.  
59
 Petition for Rehearing, supra note 57.  
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arbitrability of a particular dispute, and when ruling on motions to 
confirm or vacate arbitration awards.  The remainder of this 
chapter summarizes some of those decisions that involve FINRA 
arbitration. 
 
 A. Defenses to Arbitrability 
 
 Under the Supreme Court’s most recent FAA decisions 
(referenced above in Parts I and II), courts must enforce arbitration 
agreements according to their terms unless: 
 
1. There is an explicit contrary Congressional command; 
2. The arbitration agreement expressly strips one party of the 
substantive right (but not the procedural ability) to pursue a federal 
statutory claim (“effective vindication” defense); OR 
3. The arbitration agreement is invalid pursuant to a state law 
defense to the enforceability of any contract, but only if that 
defense 
 - applies to all contracts,  
 - doesn’t discriminate against arbitration, and  
- doesn’t frustrate the purposes of the FAA, which 
include enforcing agreements according to their terms 
AND promoting efficient, streamlined arbitration 
procedures. 
 
 This section will summarize important Courts of Appeal 
decisions that have ruled on challenges to an arbitration agreement 
based on one of these three exceptions. 
 
 1. Contrary Congressional Command 
 
 As stated above, Italian Colors reaffirmed the principle 
that the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements 
even as to federal statutory claims, “unless the FAA’s mandate has 
 16 
been ‘overridden by a contrary Congressional command.’”60  
Courts have held that one such explicit command is found in §922 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”),61 which declares that pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements purporting to require arbitration of 
whistleblower claims arising under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“SOX”)62 are not enforceable.63   
 
 In Santoro v Accenture Federal Services, LLC,
64
 the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of an order 
compelling arbitration of an employee’s federal age discrimination 
claims.  The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s contention that 
Dodd-Frank’s ban on the arbitrability of whistleblower claims 
against publicly-traded companies extended to other federal 
statutory claims brought by a non-whistleblower against a 
publicly-traded company.
65
  Thus, the court narrowly interpreted 
the “contrary Congressional command” of Dodd-Frank. 
 
 2. Effective Vindication: Enforceability of 
  Class Action Waivers  
 
Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility 
and Italian Colors, the Courts of Appeal have had no choice but to 
enforce class action waivers in arbitration clauses against 
unconscionability and “effective vindication” challenges.66  For 
                                                 
60
 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2309 (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-69 (2012)) (second internal citation 
omitted). 
61
 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
62
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
63
 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012). §806 of SOX gives a right of action to 
“whistleblowers” who report fraud at publicly-traded companies.  18 
U.S.C. §1514A (2012). 
64
 __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 1759072 (4
th
 Cir. May 5, 2014). 
65
 Id. at *5. 
66
 Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 533 F. App’x 11, 12 (2d  Cir. 2013) (relying 
on Italian Colors to reverse an order denying defendants' motion to 
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example, in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young,
67
 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals enforced a class action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement and rejected plaintiff employees’ argument that they 
could not effectively vindicate their rights because the proceeding 
would be too financially burdensome.
68
  
 
In that case, Stephanie Sutherland filed a putative class 
action against her former employer, Ernst & Young, in order to 
recover approximately $2,000 of unpaid overtime compensation in 
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New 
York Labor Law (“NYLL”).69 Ernst & Young then filed a motion 
to compel arbitration on an individual basis pursuant to the 
arbitration agreement Sutherland signed when her employment 
began.
70
 That agreement stated that all disputes between 
Sutherland and the firm would be submitted to mediation and 
arbitration and barred all class action proceedings.
71
   
 
The District Court denied Ernst & Young’s motion and 
agreed with Sutherland that requiring her to individually arbitrate 
would prevent her from effectively vindicating her rights under the 
FSLA and the NYLL because the cost of arbitrating her claims “on 
an individual basis would dwarf her potential recovery of less than 
                                                                                                    
compel arbitration on an individual basis); Murphy v. DirectTV, Inc., 724 
F.3d 1218, 1224-28+ (9th Cir. 2013) (applying AT&T Mobility  
retroactively to enforce a class action waiver in a customer agreement); 
Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (citing to Italian Colors to uphold a provision in an arbitration 
agreement waiving the ability to bring a collective action);  see also 
Duran v. J. Hass Grp., L.L.C., 531 F. App’x 146, 147 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(holding that because arbitration agreements must be rigorously enforced, 
"it was for the arbitrator, rather than the court, to decide...whether the 
forum selection clause was unconscionable.").   
67
 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).  
68
 Id. at 298. 
69
 Id. at 294.  
70
 Id. at 295.  
71
 Id.  
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$2,000.”72 Sutherland found that her attorney’s fees during 
arbitration alone would amount to around $160,000.
73
  
 
The Second Circuit reversed, in light of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s mandate in Italian Colors that lower courts “rigorously 
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including 
terms that specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their 
disputes, and the rules under which that arbitration will be 
conducted.”74 The Second Circuit found that the FLSA does not 
contain a congressional command that overrides the FAA 
mandate.
75
  It also found that Italian Colors bars Sutherland from 
using the effective vindication doctrine to invalidate a class action 
waiver based on the fact that the recovery would be dwarfed by the 
cost of individual arbitration.
76
 
 
 3. State law defenses 
 
a. FAA Preemption 
 
Under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine, the 
FAA preempts any state law or rule that conflicts with the policies 
and purposes underlying the FAA.
77
  In January 2014, the Tenth 
                                                 
72
 Id. at 294-95; see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, 768 F. Supp.2d 
547 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
73
 Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 295.  
74
 Id. at 296 (quoting Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013)).  
75
 Id. at 296-97 (finding that “the FSLA does not ‘evinc[e] an intention to 
preclude a waiver’ of class-action procedure.’” Moreover, it found that 
Supreme Court precedents prove “that the waiver of collective action 
claims is permissible in the FLSA context.”).  
76
 Id. at 298; see also Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 533 F. App’x. 11 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
77
 See e.g. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 
(2012) (holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals rule that voided as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that 
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Circuit applied the FAA preemption doctrine and held that a state 
law that asserts that arbitration is inferior to litigation in court is 
preempted by the FAA. In THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, 
LLC v. Patton,
78
 a nursing home required its residents to sign an 
arbitration agreement that required arbitration of all claims except 
claims “relating to guardianship proceedings, collection or eviction 
actions by THI, or disputes of less than $2,500.”79 Mrs. Patton, 
whose husband passed away while at THI, wanted to sue the 
nursing home for misrepresentation and negligence on behalf of 
her husband’s estate.80 THI filed a complaint to compel arbitration, 
and the District Court for New Mexico initially held that the 
arbitration agreement was not unconscionable but reversed its 
holding when the New Mexico Court of Appeals found an 
identical agreement to be unconscionable.
81
 
 
However, the Tenth Circuit held that “just as the FAA 
preempts a state statute that is predicated on the view that 
arbitration is an inferior means of vindicating rights, it also 
preempts state common law—including the law 
regarding unconscionability—that bars an arbitration 
agreement because of the same view.”82  The court therefore held 
                                                                                                    
FAA preempts California Supreme Court rule that class action waivers in 
consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable). 
78
 741 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2014).  
79
 Id. at 1164. 
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. at 1164-65.  The New Mexico Court of Appeals found the 
arbitration agreement to be unconscionable because it forced claims that 
were most likely to be brought by the nursing home residents to be 
arbitrated while leaving the claims that THI would most likely bring open 
to litigation in courts. The Court of Appeals found this unfair to the 
nursing home residents, relying on the assumption that arbitration was 
inferior to litigation in courts. Id. at 1168-69. 
82
 Id. at 1167.  
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that New Mexico’s law was preempted, and reversed the decision 
of the District Court.
83
  
 
b. Unconscionability  
 
While the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility barred lower 
courts from finding class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
to be substantively unconscionable, lower courts have struck down 
arbitration clauses as unconscionable on other grounds.  For 
example, in Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
84
 the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found an arbitration agreement 
between an employee and her employer to be procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.
85
  First, although employee 
Chavarria signed the agreement when she applied for employment 
at Ralphs, her employer did not provide the terms of the arbitration 
agreement until three weeks after she began working.
86
 The Ninth 
Circuit stated that procedural unconscionability is enhanced when 
an employee is given the binding terms of a contract after the 
employee agreed to the terms.
87
 Second, Chavarria was unable to 
negotiate the terms and was given the agreement on a “take it or 
leave it” basis.88  
 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 1170.  Accord McInnes v. LPL Financial, LLC, 994 N.E.2d 790 
(Mass. 2013) (in case arising out of FINRA arbitration, holding FAA 
preempted Massachusetts judicial doctrine that declined to compel 
arbitration of claims of unfair or deceptive trade practices).  
84
 733 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013). 
85
 “Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the 
contract was negotiated and the respective circumstances of the parties at 
that time, focusing on the level of oppression and surprise involved in the 
agreement.” Id. at 922. 
86
 Id.  
87
 Id. at 923.  
88
 Id. at 922.  
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The court also found the arbitration agreement to be 
substantively unconscionable
89
 for several reasons. First, the 
agreement provided that if “the parties do not agree on an 
arbitrator, the policy provides for the following procedure: (1) 
Each party proposes a list of three arbitrators; (2) The parties 
alternate striking one name from the other party's list of arbitrators 
until only one name remains; (3) The party ‘who has not 
demanded arbitration’ makes the first strike from the respective 
lists; and (4) The lone remaining arbitrator decides the claims.”90 
When enforced, this procedure assures that an arbitrator chosen by 
the person who did not seek arbitration would be selected. 
Therefore, in most cases where employees seek arbitration against 
Ralphs, Ralphs would get to choose the arbitrator.  
 
Likewise, another term of the arbitration agreement stated 
that arbitration fees must be allocated at the beginning of the 
arbitration and must be split evenly between the employer and the 
employee, despite the merits of the case.
91
 This apportionment of 
fees is unfair because it imposes costs on an employee who may be 
dissuaded from bringing a valid claim because it would be 
financially impracticable to do so.
92
 The court stated that the 
Supreme Court’s Italian Colors decision does not foreclose it from 
considering the financial burden the arbitration agreement would 
have on employees because the Court in Italian Colors “explicitly 
noted that the result might be different if an arbitration provision 
required a plaintiff to pay ‘filing and administrative fees attached 
to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum 
                                                 
89
 “A contract is substantively unconscionable when it is unjustifiably 
one-sided to such an extent that it ‘shocks the conscience.’” Id. at 923.  
90
 Id. at 920.  
91
 Id. at 925.  
92
 The cost of a qualified arbitrator would be $7,000-$14,000 per day. 
Making employees pay this amount would keep them from bringing 
claims because any recovery would most likely be dwarfed by the costs 
of arbitration. Id. at 925-26.  
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impracticable.’”93 In this case, Chavarria would be expected to pay 
those types of fees, making it impracticable for her to bring her 
claim. Therefore, Italian Colors was inapposite.  
 
c. Waiver  
 
In past years, this chapter has covered cases applying the 
waiver doctrine.  Under this doctrine, one party to an arbitration 
clause claims the other party waived its right to arbitrate based on 
conduct in related litigation.  While the arbitration waiver test 
varies slightly among the federal circuits, courts typically consider 
factors such as: (1) the time elapsed from commencement of 
litigation to the request for arbitration; (2) the amount and nature 
of litigation, including substantive motions and discovery; and (3) 
prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.
94
  
 
This year, courts continue to examine these factors when 
ruling on waiver arguments.  In ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int'l 
Bhd. of Teamsters,
95
 the Eighth Circuit found that “the defendants' 
initial motions to dismiss did not substantially invoke the litigation 
machinery, and therefore did not waive the right” to arbitrate.96 In 
support of its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that: 
 
defendants did not file the lawsuit or engage in extensive 
discovery.  They did not seek to serve discovery requests 
after the adversary proceeding commenced, or move to 
continue the case.  They did not present ‘multiple matters 
                                                 
93
 Id. at 927 (citing Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11).  
94
 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., 
376 F. App’x. 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. 
Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we 
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first 
available opportunity will presumptively extinguish a client's ability later 
to opt for arbitration.”). 
95
 728 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2013).  
96
 Id. at 864-65. 
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of first impression.’  This is not a case where ‘a party 
actively litigates a case for an extended period only to 
belatedly assert that the dispute should have been 
arbitrated, not litigated, in the first place.’  The litigation at 
issue here was not an alternative to the grievance 
process…97 
 
The Court reasoned that if the defendants had “file[d] a lawsuit on 
arbitrable claims, engage[d] in extensive discovery, or fail[ed] to 
move to compel arbitration and stay litigation in a timely manner, 
then they would have sufficiently invoked the litigation machinery 
and lost their right to arbitrate;
98
 however, their inaction was not 
substantial enough to warrant a waiver of arbitration.  
 
 Likewise, in BP American Prod. Co. v. Chesapeake 
Exploration, LLC,
99
 the Tenth Circuit, in assessing whether seller 
Chesapeake waived its right to arbitrate, took into consideration 
“the extent to which the party invoked and took advantage of 
litigation.”100 The Circuit Court held that because Chesapeake 
continuously tried to avoid arbitrating its claim by “protest[ing] the 
authority of the panel to adjudicate it, initiat[ing] litigation to 
prevent the panel from doing so, and expressly agree[ing] to have 
the issue decided on joint motions for summary judgment, 
Chesapeake…waived its right to arbitrate.”101 
 
   
                                                 
97
 Id. (citations omitted).  
98
 Id. at 862.  
99
 __F.3d__, 2014 WL 1724314, *4 (10th Cir. May 2, 2014). 
100
 Id. at *4. 
101
 Id.; see also Tech. in P'ship, Inc. v. Rudin, 538 F. App’x 38, 40 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (holding that defendants waived arbitration by actively 
participating in extensive pretrial discovery after spending a year in 
litigation); Cooper v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 532 F. App’x 639, 640 
(7th Cir. 2013) (finding that defendant did not waive its right to 
arbitration by participating in discovery “because the district court 
declined to stay discovery pending its ruling on the motion to dismiss”).   
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B. Who is a “Customer” Under FINRA   
  Rule 12200? 
 
In FINRA arbitration, even in the absence of a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties, a FINRA 
member firm must arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,” 
“[t]he dispute is between a customer and a member or associated 
person of a member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the 
business activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”102 
 
Thus, in a customer case, respondents may resist 
arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a “customer” of 
the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Customer 
Code Rule 12200.  Courts continue to interpret FINRA Rule 12200 
when a broker-dealer resists arbitration. 
 
In Goldman, Sachs, & Co. v. City of Reno,
103
 the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the City of Reno, which 
had retained Goldman, Sachs for advisory and underwriting 
services in connection with its issuance of auction-rate securities to 
finance a series of city projects, was a “customer” under FINRA 
Rule 12200.
104
 When financial problems arose, Reno initiated 
arbitration proceedings against Goldman, Sachs before FINRA, 
relying on FINRA Rule 12200.
105
 In turn, Goldman, Sachs moved 
for a preliminary injunction arguing that Reno was not its 
“customer.”  The Ninth Circuit relied on previous Court of 
Appeals decisions
106
 and concluded that, for purposes of FINRA 
Rule 12200, a customer is “a non-broker and non-dealer who 
                                                 
102
 FINRA R. 12200. 
103
 747 F. 3d 733, 2014 WL 1272784 (9th Cir. 2014). 
104
 Id., 2014 WL 1272784, at *6. 
105
 Id. at *1.  
106
 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, 
Ltd., 661 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2011); UBS Financial Servs. Inc. v. West 
Virginia University Hospitals Inc., 660 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in the 
course of the member's FINRA-regulated business activities.”107  
 
Using this definition, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Reno certainly qualified as Goldman, Sachs’ “customer” because 
Goldman, Sachs, “served as the underwriter for the 2005 and 2006 
Bonds and as the broker-dealer for…ARS auctions,” “sold Reno 
interest rate swaps to protect the financing structure,” “acted as 
Reno's agent in dealing with the rating agencies,” and “conducted 
discussions with bond insurers on Reno's behalf.”108 Furthermore, 
Goldman “provided these services in the course of its securities 
business activities [while] Reno compensated Goldman in the form 
of underwriter's discounts and annual broker-dealer fees.”109  
 
C. Nonsignatories to Arbitration    
  Agreements 
 
Under state law theories of equitable estoppel, agency or 
third-party beneficiary, nonsignatories may be able to compel 
arbitration of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement 
between signatories.
110
  Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
generally a nonsignatory can enforce an arbitration clause with a 
signatory: 
                                                 
107
 Goldman, 2014 WL 1272784, at *6; see also SunTrust Banks, Inc. v. 
Turnberry Capital Manamgement LP, 13-2075-cv (2d Cir. May 15, 2014) 
(summary order) (applying the WVUH test and finding hedge fund not a 
customer of bank when fund bought through a broker-dealer an 
investment vehicle sponsored by a now-defunct subsidiary of the bank).  
108
 Goldman, 2014 WL 1272784, at *6.   
109
 Id.  Although Reno persuaded the court it was Goldman’s customer, 
the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that, because the city had agreed to a 
forum selection clause in its 2005 and 2006 agreements with Goldman, 
Sachs, it had waived its right to arbitrate under FINRA Rule 12200. Id. at 
*7. 
110
 See Arthur Andersen LLP v Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009) (holding 
that, under the FAA, state law principles may permit an arbitration 
agreement to be enforced by or against  a nonsignatory). 
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(1) when a signatory must rely on the terms of the 
written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory 
or the claims are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined with’ the 
underlying contract, and  
(2) when the signatory alleges substantially 
interdependent and concerted misconduct by the nonsignatory and 
another signatory and ‘the allegations of interdependent 
misconduct [are][ founded in or intimately connected with the 
obligations of the underlying agreement.’111   
 
Likewise, if a nonsignatory can demonstrate it is a third-
party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement, it can enforce that 
agreement against signatories.
112
 Under the agency theory, a 
nonsignatory can invoke arbitration against a signatory “if a 
preexisting confidential relationship, such as an agency 
relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the 
arbitration agreement, makes it equitable to impose the duty to 
arbitrate upon the nonsignatory.”113 
 
Some Courts of Appeal continue to narrowly construe 
these three exceptions.  This past year, the Ninth Circuit rejected -- 
under all three theories -- a retailer’s motion to compel arbitration 
of claims with its retail customers who had entered into a customer 
service agreement with a satellite television service provider by 
purchasing the service after leasing equipment in the retailer’s 
stores.
114
  
                                                 
111
 See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 
2013) (internal citations omitted).  
112
 See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, 504 F. App’x. 694, 
698 (10th Cir. 2012). 
113
 Murphy v. DirectTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
114
 See Murphy, 724 F.3d at 1228-34.  Accord Hirsch v. Amper Financial 
Servs, LLC, 71 A.3d 849 (N.J. 2013) (refusing to apply equitable 
estoppel doctrine to compel arbitration of nonsignatory’s claims merely 
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Other courts are more willing to compel arbitration with a 
nonsignatory.  For example, the Fifth Circuit found that under the 
first exception, when a signatory plaintiff’s “claims against the 
nonsignatory are founded in and inextricably bound up with the 
obligations imposed by the agreement containing the arbitration 
clause,” state law would permit the nonsignatory to compel the 
plaintiff signatory to arbitrate their claims.
115
 Similarly, the Sixth 
Circuit used both the first and third exceptions to hold that since 
nonsignatory Nair was an agent of defendant, a debt resolution 
service, Nair could compel arbitration against signatory plaintiff.
116
 
The court further found that the plaintiff’s claims against Nair 
were intertwined with the underlying contract.
117
 
 
D. Vacating Arbitration Awards 
 
 1. Evident Partiality  
 
Losing parties to arbitration awards can seek vacatur 
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in the 
arbitrators.  Courts have had difficulty developing a test for 
“evident partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision under 
that subsection is the 45-year old decision in Commonwealth 
Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.,
118 
and that case yielded 
plurality and concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize.  
Most circuits follow the test set forth by the Second Circuit in 
                                                                                                    
because claims and parties were intertwined with signatories); Belzberg 
v. Verus Investments Holdings, Inc., 999 N.E.2d 1130 (N.Y. 2013) 
(refusing to compel arbitration of nonsignatory’s claims under theory of 
equitable estoppel because nonsignatory did not benefit directly from the 
arbitration agreement). 
115
 Crawford Prof'l Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., __F.3d__, No. 
12–60922, 2014 WL 1343608, *6 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2014).    
116
 Bowie v. Clear Your Debt, LLC, 523 F. App’x 315, 317 (6th Cir. 
2013).  
117
 Id.  
118
 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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Morelite Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. 
Funds,
119
 where the court held that “evident partiality” is “where a 
reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was 
partial to one party to the arbitration.”120 
 
Courts differ on how an arbitrator’s failure to disclose 
potential sources of conflicts of interest factors into an evident 
partiality analysis.  This past year, in Stone v. Bear Stearns & 
Co., Inc.,121 the Third Circuit refused to vacate an arbitration 
award against an investor even though one of the arbitrators failed 
to disclose that her husband recently earned consulting income 
from the Respondent broker-dealer.  In that case, Laurence Stone 
sued Bear Stearns for $7.6 million in investment losses.  The panel 
rejected all of his claims. Stone later discovered that one panelist, 
Jerrilyn Marston, had disclosed to FINRA that her husband “was a 
well-known professor of finance at the Wharton School and that he 
regularly lectured to brokerage firms, financial consultants, banks, 
and investors,” including the Respondent.122  However, FINRA 
disclosed to the parties only that Ms. Marston had a “Family 
Member associated with the University of Pennsylvania.”123  
 
The district court denied Stone’s motion to vacate the 
award on the ground of evident partiality.  It concluded that this 
failure to disclose did not constitute “evident partiality” and that 
Stone waived his right to that contention because he failed to 
discover this information earlier.  The Third Circuit affirmed 
summarily.
124
  
   
                                                 
119
 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).  
120
 Id. at 83. 
121
 538 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2013). 
122
 Id. at 170. 
123
 Id. 
124
 Id. at 170-71. 
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2. Exceeding Powers: Availability of Attorney’s  
  Fees  
 
If a FINRA arbitration panel includes attorney’s fees in an 
award, the losing party sometimes challenges that award on the 
grounds that the panel exceeded its powers under FAA §10(a)(4), 
or was otherwise “arbitrary.”  The Tenth Circuit recently held that 
FINRA arbitrators have the authority to award attorney’s fees to 
parties when “’all of the parties request or agree to such fees.’”125  
In Adviser Dealer Services, both parties requested attorney’s fees 
in their respective arbitration pleadings.  The FINRA submission 
agreement they both signed stated that they agreed to submit their 
dispute and “all issues identified in those pleadings” to FINRA.126  
Thus, the parties empowered the arbitrators to award attorney’s 
fees, and by doing so, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers.   
 
Similarly, in a promissory note case, the Fourth Circuit 
reinstated an award of more than $60,000 in attorney’s fees that 
the district court had vacated on the grounds that the panel failed to 
articulate any analysis of the amount.
127
  The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that arbitrators are not required to explain their reasons 
and courts must give deference to arbitrator’s factual findings.  
Since the underlying promissory note’s arbitration agreement 
expressly provided for the recovery of attorney’s fees by the 
broker-dealer in the event it had to initiate an arbitration 
proceeding to collect on the note, the district court should have 
confirmed, not vacated, the panel’s fee award.128  
 
 3. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
 
                                                 
125
 Adviser Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., __ F. App’x __, 
2014 WL 541914, *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). 
126
 Id.  
127
 Wells Fargo Advisers LLC v. Watts, 540 F. App’x 229 (4th Cir. 2013). 
128
 Id. at 231-32. 
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Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc., 
L.L.C.  v. Mattel, Inc.
129
 that the FAA provides the exclusive 
grounds for review of an arbitration award and parties to an 
arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the judicial 
grounds of review, the circuit courts have split on whether an 
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid 
ground to vacate an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.130  The circuit split continues, as follows: 
 
 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard” 
ground of vacatur.
131
 
 The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have 
expressly ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur 
ground.
132
   
 The First and Tenth Circuits have addressed 
“manifest disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.133 
                                                 
129
 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
130
 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010). 
131
 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Wachovia 
Securities, LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although 
we find that manifest disregard continues to exist as either an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which of the 
two it is because Wachovia’s claim fails under both”); Coffee Beanery, 
Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008); Comedy 
Club, Inc. v.  Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).  
But see Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 2014 WL 
30713,*4  (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2014) (suggesting that the Sixth Circuit might 
revisit the issue, “which has not been firmly settled”). 
132
 See Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352 (5th 
Cir. 2009); Medicine Shoppe Intern., Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., 614 
F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 
1324 (11th Cir. 2010).   
133
 See Kashner Davidson Secs. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 
2010) (acknowledging that the circuit has “not squarely determined 
whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall 
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 The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly 
declined to address the issue.
134
   
 The Seventh Circuit has held that “manifest 
disregard” is not a ground of vacatur, except if arbitrators order 
parties to violate the legal rights of others.
135
 
                                                                                                    
Street”); Affinity Financial Corp. v. AARP Financial, Inc., 468 F. App’x 
4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assuming, without deciding, that the 
manifest disregard of the law standard survived Hall Street). 
134
 See Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, _ F. App’x __, No. 12-
4253, 2014 WL 323380, *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2014) (recognizing circuit 
split and expressly declining to decide that issue); Rite Aid New Jersey, 
Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers Union, Local 1360, 449 F. 
App’x. 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2011) (assuming without deciding that the 
manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street); Abbott v. Law Office 
of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x. 612, 620 (10th Cir. 2011) (“in the 
absence of firm guidance from the Supreme Court, we decline to decide 
whether the manifest disregard standard should be entirely jettisoned”).  
But see Adviser Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., __ F. App’x 
__, 2014 WL 541914 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (in dicta, recognizing 
manifest regard as an available ground of vacatur).  
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 See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 
281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Except to the extent recognized in George 
Watts & Son [v. Tiffany & Co., Inc., 248 F.d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (ruling 
that “a court may set aside an award that directs the parties to violate the 
legal rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration”)], 
‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may 
reject an arbitrator's award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”).  
